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viewpoint
Third Wave Feminism’s Unhappy Marriage of 
Poststructuralism and Intersectionality Theory
Susan Archer Mann, University of New Orleans
Abstract: This article first traces the history of unhappy marriages of disparate theoretical perspectives in 
US feminism. In recent decades, US third-wave authors have arranged their own unhappy marriage in that 
their major publications reflect an attempt to wed poststructuralism with intersectionality theory. Although 
the standpoint epistemology of intersectionality theory shares some common ground with the epistemology 
of poststructuralism, their epistemological assumptions conflict on a number of important dimensions. 
This contested terrain has generated serious debates within the third wave and between second- and third-
wave feminists. The form, content, and political implications of their “unhappy marriage” are the subject 
of this article.  
Keywords: third-wave feminism, feminist theory, feminist epistemology
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Introduction
US feminism has a long history of living through unhappy marriages. In the nineteenth century the doctrine 
of coverture governed marriage laws across most of the United States. Under this doctrine, once a man 
and women married they were considered one before the law. This “one” was the husband who controlled 
the property and income of the household and had the right to chastise his wife and children. The famous 
“Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments,” established in 1848 at the first women’s rights conference in 
the United States, directly attacked this doctrine. It enumerated various ways in which men established 
“tyranny” over women, including “taking from her all right to property, even to the wages she earns” and 
“making her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead” (Stanton [1848] 2005, 72). 
Mirroring the doctrine of coverture, in the late twentieth century the term “unhappy marriage” virtually 
became a cliché for feminist theorists’ attempts to wed contradictory or disparate perspectives where 
one approach came to dominate the other. In the early 1980s, Heidi Hartmann referred to the “unhappy 
marriage of Marxism and feminism” to criticize how Marxism (like the husband) dominated feminism (the 
wife) because class trumped gender in Marxist feminists’ understanding of women’s oppression (Hartmann 
1981). In the early 1990s, Cheshire Calhoun discussed the “unhappy marriage of feminist theory and lesbian 
theory” in her critique of how patriarchy was given greater salience than heterosexism in second-wave 
radical feminism ([1994] 2003). These feminist critiques were leveled against hierarchicalizing oppressions 
or treating one form of oppression as more important than another. Both Hartmann and Calhoun urged 
feminists to clearly distinguish between different forms of oppression and not to treat one form as simply 
derivative of the other.
Controversies over hierarchicalizing forms of oppression are rare today, given the powerful impact of 
feminisms that focus on differences between women and the multiplicity of oppressions they experience. Key 
voices in the rise of this feminist scholarship of difference were those of US women of color who highlighted 
the “simultaneous” and “multiple” nature of oppressions as the “most significant contribution” of their 
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approach (Smith 1983, xxxii). Rudimentary forms of intersectional analysis existed during the first wave.1 
However, it was not until the second wave that this approach came to be known by a number of specific 
names, such as the women-of-color perspective (Moraga and Anzaldúa [1981] 1983); intersectionality 
theory (Crenshaw 1989); and US Third World feminism (Sandoval [1991] 2003). Despite its long history, 
intersectional analysis—whether viewed as a theory, a method, a metaphor, and/or a politics—only began 
to gain hegemony in US feminist thought in the 1980s, following the publication of such signal works as the 
Combahee River Collective’s “Black Feminist Statement” (1977) and This Bridge Called My Back: Writings 
by Radical Women of Color edited by Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa ([1981] 1983).2 Interestingly, 
it was second-wave women of color who first used the term “third wave” to distinguish their intersectional 
approach—although this particular moniker was seldom used (Springer 2002, 1063).
Other theoretical perspectives that became more prominent within US feminism in the 1980s and 1990s—
postmodernist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial feminisms—also focused attention on polyvocality or the 
multiple voices generated by diverse vantage points on social reality (Grant 1993; Fuss 1989; Mohanty 
1984). Like intersectionality theorists, they too ushered in calls to deconstruct essentialist conceptions 
of “woman” and to decenter feminisms that spoke only to the interests of women of privileged classes, 
races, ethnicities, sexual orientations, and/or global locations. All of these polyvocal feminisms rested on 
epistemologies that fundamentally challenged and shook the foundations of modern scientific thought. As 
a result, the former trend toward seeking universal “truths” and theoretical convergence gave way to the 
recognition of multiple “truths” and theoretical pluralism (Cheal 1991, 153). This momentous change is 
stated quite simply in the title of Sandra Harding’s influential book on feminist epistemologies, Is Science 
Multicultural? (1998).
A number of observers have referred to this focus on difference, deconstruction, and decentering as 
a “paradigm shift” in feminist thought because of its radical break with earlier feminisms (Barrett and 
Phillips 1992; Hekman 2004; Mann 2012). In their aptly titled book, Destabilizing Theory, Michèle Barrett 
and Ann Phillips write:
The founding principles of contemporary western feminism have been dramatically challenged with previous 
shared assumptions and unquestioned orthodoxies relegated almost to history. These changes have been of the 
order of a “paradigm shift,” in which assumptions rather than conclusions are radically overturned. (1992, 2)
Grounding the Paradigm Shift Socially
Toward a history of the vanishing present. 
— Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason
The social grounding of this paradigm shift has both global and national dimensions. The rise of the 
scholarship of difference has been linked to new social movements that fostered the collapse of the Euro-
American West’s hold on its colonial empires in the post–World War II era and sharpened conflicts within 
European and American societies. In the United States these conflicts spawned the anti–Vietnam war 
movement, the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the lesbian and gay rights movement, and 
the Black, Red, and Brown power movements of African-Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos/as 
(Lemert 2004). Such attempts to decenter both the West globally and dominant groups within Western 
nations were important triggers for this paradigm shift. 
Yet, in a more profound sense, the shift to a focus on difference, deconstruction, and decentering 
reflects the seismic changes in social conditions wrought by postmodernity (Mann 2012). Globalization and 
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digitalization have been signal features of this new world order. Not only has globalization unsettled and 
blurred national boundaries, but it has decentered the First World’s industrial working class. In the face of 
the offshoring and outsourcing that accompanied increased US corporate investments abroad, the United 
States deindustrialized. Between 1965 and 1985 alone, the manufacturing share of US total employment 
was cut in half and real male wages experienced their sharpest reduction ever in a two-decade period when 
US gross domestic product was advancing (Thurow 1996, 223–24). In turn, US women entered the labor 
force in record numbers to buttress their household incomes. The rise in low-paying service jobs provided 
employment not only for US women, but also for large numbers of immigrants from Latin America and 
Asia. In the 1990s, over a million immigrants were entering the United States each year, with women 
making up an increasing percentage of this foreign labor (Macionis 2011). That feminists have been focusing 
more attention on race, ethnicity, and global location reflects the changing demographics of the US labor 
force, the feminization of migration, and the increasingly global nature of the division of labor (Mann and 
Huffman 2005).3
Marked advances in globalization were made possible by the growth of the new digital, microchip, 
and satellite technologies that annihilated previous barriers of time and space. These new technologies 
dramatically quicken the distribution of ideas, which flash by with a speed that makes them difficult to 
unpack. Moreover, their ability to create simulations and virtual realities blurs the lines between artifice 
and reality (Baudrillard 1983). In such a swirling sea of signs and symbols, it is no wonder that in many 
contemporary theories discourse appears to have inordinate power or that a major theoretical device used 
to decode such messages—deconstruction—has become a buzzword in social thought (Agger 1998, 125). 
Although such technological developments have been ingenious, science and technology in general have 
been subjected to intense critical scrutiny by social theorists in recent decades. Their rational means, which 
earlier theorists claimed would promote social progress, created major risks that plague our planet today, 
such as environmental pollution and nuclear arms. As the irrationality of rationality became more visible, 
increasing skepticism was directed toward the rules governing scientific inquiry and what is deemed as 
credible knowledge. Feminist Jane Flax called this the “end of innocence” in terms of viewing science as 
the key to truth and social well-being (Flax 1992). Indeed, the deconstruction of science by new feminist 
epistemologies revealed the hidden fingerprints of power underlying scientific inquiries and engendered a 
radical uncertainty in regard to what constitutes “truth” and whose “truth” is privileged.  
The latter topic is the primary subject of this article. The unhappy marriage examined here took place 
after this paradigm shift in feminist thought and was arranged by US feminist authors who published under 
the banner of the third wave. I call it the “unhappy marriage of poststructuralism and intersectionality 
theory” because these two perspectives, which inspired their writings, have conflicting epistemologies that 
make the marriage untenable.
Who Is the “Third Wave”?
I am the third wave… 
— Rebecca Walker, “Becoming the Third Wave” (my emphasis)
In the 1990s, the US women’s movement witnessed a resurgence of feminist activism and scholarship among 
a new generation of feminists so large and unexpected that some referred to it as a “genderquake” (Wolf 
1994, 25). Although debates have ensued as to whether this resurgence of feminism constitutes a “new” 
wave (Berger 2006) or whether this oceanography of feminist waves is even useful (Mann 2012, xvii–xviii), 
the third wave has become the banner under which many women identify their new brand of feminism.4
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Clearly, demarcating exactly who constitutes the third wave is not without difficulty. Its constituents have 
been referred to in myriad ways that often focus more on their age or generation than on their contributions 
to feminist theory or activism. Many of the early writings of self-identified third wavers used specific dates 
of birth, for example between 1963 and 1974 (Heywood and Drake 1997), while other writers used collective 
designations such as “Generation X,” the “twenty-somethings,” or the “Jane Generation” (Kamen 1991; 
Johnson 2002). Mother-daughter tropes also were used to describe these feminists’ relationship to their 
second-wave predecessors, often resulting in themes of generational conflict and rebellion (Quinn 1997; 
Henry 2004). However, as these young women aged and new recruits joined the third wave, birth dates and 
generational criteria became less useful for distinguishing this new wave of feminism. Some observers even 
warn that generational accounts of feminism provide a tool for dividing the feminist movement (Berger 
2006) and/or fostering an antifeminist backlash (Gillis and Munford 2004, 177–78).  
Other writers have suggested using the notion of a “political generation” to designate the third wave. 
The key to political generations is that they reflect the life experiences and concerns of a particular 
historical moment—the moment when a person becomes politicized; thus, a political generation could 
include more than one chronological generation (Whittier 1995, 15).  No doubt there is much to learn from 
historically grounding the discourse of third-wave feminism in the turbulent, uncertain social conditions of 
postmodernity, especially given the stark differences between the political and economic conditions faced 
by both the second and the third wave when they entered their respective adulthoods (Sidler 1997; Heywood 
and Drake 2004; Mann and Huffman 2005).
In contrast to the ways of designating the third wave I have outlined above, this article focuses on the 
theoretical assumptions employed by US feminist authors who identify as belonging to the third wave. 
While it is doubtful that all US feminists who mobilize under this banner share a uniform perspective, 
their major publications share a number of theoretical and epistemological assumptions that reflect an 
attempt to merge the two feminist frameworks by which they were heavily influenced: poststructuralist 
feminism and intersectionality theory. This view of US third-wave theory was first described by Deborah 
Siegel in “Legacy of the Personal: Generating Theory in Feminism’s Third Wave,” where she discussed how 
these earlier perspectives “shaped the form and content of third wave expressions” (1997a, 46). My analysis 
examines these theoretical links more closely to highlight their epistemological assumptions and to expose 
the contradictions entailed in merging the two feminist frameworks. It must be emphasized that calling the 
approach of third-wave authors a synthetic derivation does not mean it lacks originality. Rather, it is the 
complex ways in which they interweave these earlier feminisms that make their third-wave agenda novel.
It may seem ironic to focus on third-wave authors’ theoretical perspective when their writings have been 
described as without theory. One review of Rebecca Walker’s signal work, To Be Real: Telling the Truth 
and Changing the Face of Feminism (1995), portrayed her anthology as “not a book of feminist theory,” but 
rather “a very personal book filled with anecdotes about individuals’ own struggles” (Haslanger quoted in 
Siegel 1997a, 67). A harsher critic referred to the contributors to Listen Up: Voices from the Next Feminist 
Generation (1995) as “amateur memoirists” who confuse “feeling bad” with oppression and who “believe 
their lives are intrinsically interesting to strangers” (Kaminer quoted in Siegel 1997a, 67). Katha Politt’s 
article, acerbically titled “The Solipsisters,” labeled third-wave publications as “self-absorbed writings” 
that naively assume “personal testimony, impressions and feelings are all you need to make a political 
argument” (quoted in Baumgardner and Richards 2000, 19–20). Even avid supporters of the third wave, 
such as the editors of Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism for the 20th Century, state that “it is time 
to move beyond personal accounts to political and collective action” and urge their peers to use personal 
experiences “as a bridge to larger political and theoretical explorations” (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 13). 
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No doubt, the preferred genre of third-wave authors—personal narratives—is a difficult form of writing 
from which to unravel theoretical assumptions, precisely because these narratives are so individual and 
subjective. Nevertheless, “claims that the third wave is a theory-free movement … are epistemologically 
naïve, historically inaccurate, and, ultimately, misinformed” (Siegel 1997a, 49). There are common threads 
running through these narratives that weave together the underlying theoretical fabric of third-wave 
feminism. Siegel refers to these threads as “common tropes, images, motifs, narrative patterns and general 
issues of concern” (1997a, 51). By whatever name, they reveal the theoretical ground shared by the agents of 
this wave. Though “third-wave feminism” remains a contested concept, I concur with a recent analyst that
despite conflicts over definitional issues and inconsistencies in its usage, the phrase “third wave” is meaningful 
insofar as several dimensions are repeatedly associated with it and these cohere to the extent that it is feasible 
to regard them as a distinct form of feminism. (Budgeon 2011, 4)
Yet, because these repeated assumptions are less obvious, we have to read between the lines, so to speak, to 
discover this less explicit or “embodied theory” (Bordo 1993, 184–85).  
This study, then, follows in the footprints of authors such as Deborah Siegel (1997a, 2007), Rory Dicker 
and Alison Piepmeier (2003), Astrid Henry (2004), and Shelley Budgeon (2011), who analyzed major 
publications of feminists who identify as belonging to the third wave.5 This textual analysis should not be 
read as a metonymic view of the US third wave in which only one part of its practices—major published 
works by its authors—is taken to represent all of its visions and voices. Rather, the narrow parameters of 
this study entail certain limitations. First, using major published works privileges those voices and silences 
other diverse sites of theorizing such as zines, blogs, art, or music by which third wavers have made their 
voices heard. Second, published works are often written by college-educated women, thereby introducing a 
class bias, given that only about thirty percent of adult US women 25 years and older have a four-year college 
degree (Macionis 2011). Third, although the implications of various theoretical assumptions for political 
praxis will be addressed, this is not a study of US third-wave activism—a massive task beyond the scope of 
this article. Fourth, focusing on the United States ignores new directions in third-wave thought undertaken 
by feminists in other countries. For example, less visible in US third-wave publications are the materialist 
approaches embraced by some European feminists (Van der Tuin 2011) or the transnational approaches 
used by various contributors to international anthologies such as Defending Our Dreams: Global Feminist 
Voices for a New Generation (Wilson, Sengupta and Evans 2005) and Third Wave Feminism: A Critical 
Exploration (Gillis, Howe and Munford [2004] 2007). Indeed, given time, it is likely that we will speak of 
different third-wave feminisms, just as we speak of different feminisms within both the first and second 
waves. However, this study is limited by focusing only on the theoretical assumptions most characteristic of 
US third-wave publications to date.  
In defense of this limited textual analysis, it is important to acknowledge that much feminist critical 
analysis in the past (whether of authors in the first, second or third waves) has addressed major published 
works as signaling (if not representing) important insights into the theoretical and epistemological 
foundations of different feminist frameworks. In turn, many authors of the works examined below have 
become major spokespersons for the US third wave at international, national, and local conferences and 
workshops, as well as in the mass media, which—rightly or wrongly—gives their voices privilege and 
currency.  
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Tracing a Lineage to Intersectionality Theory
I stand on the shoulders of women like Barbara Smith, Audre Lorde and Luisah Teish….
— Veronica Chambers, “Betrayal Feminism”
In recent years, closer scrutiny of “intersectionality” has revealed both its complexity and its misuse (McCall 
2005; Hancock 2007; Choo and Ferree 2010; Nash 2010; Alexander-Floyd 2012). Without entering into this 
dense debate, suffice it to say that I use intersectionality both as an “idea” and as an “ideograph” (Alexander-
Floyd 2012, 3). In this article, I primarily refer to intersectionality as a specific theory or idea that focuses 
on and explicates the simultaneous and intersecting or co-determinative forces of racism, sexism, classism, 
and heterosexism in the lives of women. In turn, I discuss the political implications of this specific theory 
and, therefore, address intersectionality in the ideographic sense of a broader project focused on social 
justice theorizing and action (Alexander-Floyd 2012, 4–5). As will become more apparent below, I share 
Nikol Alexander-Floyd’s view that women of color often “disappear” when the epistemological assumptions 
underlying intersectionality are ignored, thus reversing the original intent of those who pioneered 
intersectional analysis (Alexander-Floyd 2012, 17–18).
Many third-wave authors, regardless of their own racial or ethnic backgrounds, trace their lineage to the 
US second-wave women of color who forged intersectionality theory. For example, in Third Wave Agenda 
(1997), editors Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake state, “It was US Third World Feminism that modeled 
a language and a politics of hybridity that can account for our lives at the century’s turn” (1997, 13). Daisy 
Hernández, Bushra Rehman, and Cherríe Moraga, the editors of Colonize This! Young Women of Color 
in Today’s Feminism (2002), describe their anthology as “continuing the conversations” first initiated by 
second-wave intersectionality theorists (2002, xxi). In Feminist Fatale (1991), Paula Kamen acknowledges 
that the “authors with the most undeniable influence on my generation ... are women of color” (Kamen 
1991, 17). One of the more poignant testimonies to this influence appears in Veronica Chambers’s “Betrayal 
Feminism” (1995), which critiques other forms of second-wave feminism while lauding the work of 
intersectionality theorists:  
When I bought Barbara Smith’s Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, I carried it like a prayer book. It was 
in this book that I first read Audre Lorde, Michelle Cliff, June Jordan and Luisah Teish. When I read Michelle 
Cliff’s “If I Could Write This Fire, I Would Write This Fire,” the title alone reverberated in my head like a 
drumbeat. (Chambers 1995, 24)
Chronicler of the third wave Astrid Henry argues that intersectionality theorists’ central insight into the 
simultaneous, interlocking nature of multiple oppressions has been “the second wave’s most influential and 
vital lesson” for the third wave (2004, 32).
Common Epistemological Ground
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century a paradigm shift has been under way in epistemology, a 
movement away from an absolutist, subject-centered conception of truth to a conception of truth as situated, 
perspectival and discursive.
— Susan Hekman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”
Because there is not one feminism but many feminisms, feminists do not always agree on epistemological 
positioning. To date, the major feminist epistemologies have been divided into three camps that hold distinct 
positions on who can be knowledge producers and how knowledge is produced. These three epistemological 
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camps—empiricist, standpoint, and postmodern—have been discussed at length by various scholars 
(Harding 1993 and 2005; Hekman 2004; Hesse-Biber, Leavy and Yaiser 2004). I argue that many US 
third-wave authors wed approaches with analytically distinct epistemologies, given that poststructuralism 
embraces a postmodern epistemology while intersectionality theory employs a standpoint epistemology. 
Below I focus on the common ground shared by these epistemologies to better understand third-wave 
authors’ attempts to merge them. 
First, the epistemologies of intersectionality theory and poststructuralism both embrace a strong social-
constructionist view of knowledge. This means they highlight the relationship between knowledge and 
power, as well as how people construct knowledge from different social locations, such as their race, gender, 
class, and global location. Because all vantage points are socially situated and perspectival, both of these 
epistemologies embrace polyvocality or the inclusion of many voices or vantage points in their construction 
of social reality. 
Second, common ground is visible in the joint call of these epistemologies for the excavation and retrieval 
of subjugated knowledges as critical acts that undermine dominant discourses. These are the knowledges of 
subordinate groups that have been buried, ignored, silenced, or deemed less credible by dominant groups. 
Poststructuralist Michel Foucault referred to them as “naïve knowledges,” not because they are naïve in 
themselves but rather because they are treated as such by dominant groups (Foucault 1984, 81–82).  
Evidence of third-wave authors’ commitment to polyvocality and the retrieval of subjugated knowledges 
can be found in most major third-wave publications. For example, the editors of third-wave anthologies are 
careful to include authors of subjugated and diverse races, ethnicities, genders, and sexualities (although 
their diversity by social class is less apparent). Anthologies such as To Be Real (1995), Listen Up (1995), 
and Colonize This! (2002) exemplify this approach to voicing difference. More recently, contributors to 
“Polyphonic Feminisms: Acting in Concert” (2010) went even further to examine the difficulties or “sticking 
points” of polyvocal, intersectional analyses and political praxis (Nash 2010). They point, for example, to 
how organizations committed to these politics sometimes “implode” because of the difficulties of working 
across differences within the group (Van Devin and Kubala 2010). They also suggest ways of addressing 
these difficulties that enable both diversity and dissent.
A third feature shared by standpoint and postmodern epistemologies is the recognition that there is no 
such thing as value neutrality in social research and analysis. This is well stated in third-wave feminist Julie 
Bettie’s award-winning book Women without Class: Girls, Race and Identity (2003). Bettie discusses how 
her generation grew up amid the “crises of ethnographic authority” that posed a challenge to the ideal of an 
impartial science (Bettie 2003, 17). Her ethnography recognizes that researchers do not offer a “view from 
nowhere” or what other critical analysts call the “God trick”—pretending to be a detached, neutral observer 
who sees from everywhere and nowhere (Bettie 2003, 22). 
A fourth terrain of common ground is that these epistemologies recognize the reflexive nature of 
knowledge. People both construct knowledge/discourses and are constructed by them—what Sandra 
Harding referred to as a “co-constructionist view of knowledge” (Harding 1998, 4).  Hence, authors must 
acknowledge how their social locations influence their knowledge claims and be accountable for how 
their knowledge claims may influence other people. On the one hand, third-wave writers’ preference for 
personal narratives reflects their commitment to such authorial accountability and transparency. Personal 
narratives are one of the more transparent ways of acknowledging authorial presence and one’s role in 
the construction of knowledge. On the other hand, rather than speaking for other women, third wavers 
resist using the foundational claims of the second-wave feminist “we” (Siegel 1997b, 57). This critical stance 
Mann: Third Wave Feminism's Unhappy Marriage
61Journal of Feminist Scholarship 4 (Spring 2013)
stems from the deconstructionist techniques of postmodernism and poststructuralism, as well as from the 
critiques by intersectionality theorists of the second-wave “sisterhood” that too often spoke for “all women” 
and ignored difference. Consider the words of third-wave feminist Jee Yeun Lee:
These days, whenever someone says the word “women” to me, my mind goes blank. What “women”? What is 
this “women” thing you’re talking about? Does that mean me? Does that mean my mother, my roommates, the 
white woman next door … half of the world’s population? (quoted in Siegel 1997a, 57–58)
A fifth epistemological feature shared by poststructuralism and intersectionality theory and embraced 
by third-wave authors is the call for a broader description of the activity that customarily qualifies as 
theoretical, pointing to multiple sites of theory production both inside and outside of the academy. For 
example, second-wave intersectionality theorists elevated the value of socially lived knowledge or the 
knowledge garnered from everyday life. In Black Feminist Thought (1990), Patricia Hill Collins refers to 
this knowledge as “wisdom” as contrasted to formal education (Collins 1990, 208). In Tapestries of Life: 
Women’s Work, Women’s Consciousness, and the Meaning of Daily Life (1989), Bettina Aptheker points to 
the importance of socially lived knowledge and what she calls the “dailiness” of women’s lives. In “Poetry Is 
Not a Luxury,” Audre Lorde makes the case that poetry is a “distillation of experience” that can serve as an 
emancipatory project for women (Lorde 1984, 37). Similarly, in “The Race for Theory,” Barbara Christian 
argues that “people of color have always theorized—but in forms quite different from the Western form of 
abstract logic”:
Our theorizing (and I intentionally use the verb rather than the noun) is often in narrative forms, in the stories 
we create, in riddles and proverbs, in the play with language, since dynamic rather than fixed ideas seem more 
to our liking. (Christian 1988, 52)
This defense of multiple sites, forms and foundations of theorizing also can be found in third-wave 
writings. In “Producing Sex, Theory, and Culture: Gay/Straight Remappings in Contemporary Feminism” 
(1990), Katie King speaks of how the academy often privileges certain types of theory production and leaves 
others unacknowledged or deemed lesser.
Some analysts of third-wave texts argue that “the majority of third-wave feminists have been quick to 
define themselves as primarily non-academic” (Gillis and Munford 2004, 168). In particular, third-wave 
authors critique the abstract, abstruse language of academia as failing to meet the needs of women “outside 
the ivied gates” and as draining ideas of their relevance to the real world of politics and action (Wolf 
1994, 125). For example, third-wave authors Veronica Chambers and Joan Morgan highlight distinctions 
between the socially lived knowledge they drew from their everyday lives and the academic knowledge they 
acquired in women’s studies classes (Chambers 1995; Morgan 1999). In her third-wave hip-hop classic 
When Chickenheads Come Home to Roost (1999), Morgan, like Chambers, expresses her gratitude to the 
university curriculum that exposed her to the works of women of color. However, she wants a feminism 
that speaks to young Black women, the way that hip hop does: “If feminism is to have any relevance in the 
lives of the majority of black women … it has to rescue itself from the ivory towers of academia” (Morgan 
1999, 76). Because her critique is leveled at both white feminist theorists and feminist theorists of color, 
one observer writes:
Morgan seems to suggest that academia is like a bleaching agent, inevitably whitening those who choose it as a 
career path. Whiteness and intellectualism both have the same effect, a feminism that is out of touch with young 
black women. (Henry 2004, 155)
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A similar critique of academic feminism can be found in the third-wave anthology edited by Jessica 
Yee, Feminism for Real: Deconstructing the Academic Industrial Complex of Feminism (2011). A number 
of contributors to this book (including Yee) are indigenous women who experienced racism and classism 
within the university system and felt that abstract theory, even the “hot language of intersectionality,” did 
not “change their walk”—it neither reduced the racism they experienced nor translated well into social-
justice activism (Yee 2011, 12).6 They found that their academic experiences entailed various colonialist 
features, which enhanced their feelings of being other and lesser and fractured their own understandings 
of the world in ways that silenced their native cultures (Yee 2011, 16–17; Williams and Konsmo in Yee 2011, 
28–29; Cruz in Yee 2011, 54–55). Postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak labeled this latter form 
of violence “epistemic violence” in her various efforts to decolonize feminist thought produced, in Chandra 
Mohanty’s words, “under Western eyes” (Spivak 1987; Mohanty 1984).7 Spivak and other postcolonial 
theorists have done much to explain the very processes that Yee and her contributors simply describe. And, 
while describing difference certainly allows feminists to bear witness to the operations of power, “it does 
not analyze the mechanisms by which these systems of exclusion are replicated and re-created” (Nash 2010, 
2). The latter is the role of theory.
It is ironic that Yee found intersectionality to be too academic to be politically useful when intersectionality 
theorists have been among the most vocal US feminists in criticizing how academic theories and scientific 
discourses have been used against women of color. A number of these theorists chafed at how the elitist and 
exclusionary language of various feminist theories performed powerful gatekeeping functions that excluded 
women of color (Collins 1998; Di Stefano 1990). However, unlike Morgan and Yee, they did not call for 
feminism to rescue itself from the ivory tower. Rather, they called for a broadening of what is meant by 
theory and the recognition of how both socially lived knowledge and academic theory feed and revitalize 
each other. In Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins discusses both the importance of theory and how 
“Black women intellectuals are central to Black feminist thought” (Collins 1990, 33). Similarly, in “Theory 
as a Liberatory Practice” (1994), bell hooks criticizes those who “trash” theory and who praise “speaking 
from the gut” rather than in the abstract as promoting a “false dichotomy between theory and political 
practice” (hooks 1994, 65). She highlights how theories entail important ideas, thoughts and visions. In her 
words, “Making theory is the challenge before us. For in its production lies the hope of our liberation….” 
(1994, 75).  Ironically, it is not intersectionality theorists but rather scholars who use the most abstract and 
abstruse prose—postmodernists and poststructuralists—who are most wary of theory, as I will discuss next. 
Tracing a Lineage to Poststructuralism and Its Stepchild Queer Theory
Do not commit a master narrative….
— Brian McHale, “Postmodernism, or the Anxiety of Master Narratives”
Postmodernists and poststructuralists are wary of metanarratives and generalizing theories, because they 
view these discourses as moves for power or dominance rather than as attempts at greater clarity. Foucault, 
for example, discussed how different ways of specifying knowledge and truth can restrict or enable writing, 
speaking, thinking, and acting. He offered a politically laden view of theory, science, and truth where “truth” 
becomes multiple and suspect.
Under the assumptions of a postmodern epistemology there is no single truth but many different truths 
situated in different discourses, none of which have any greater claim to epistemic privilege or “truth” 
(Hekman 2004, 229). Foucault’s work further points to how theories—even emancipatory theories—are 
often blind to their dominating tendencies (Ramazanoglu 1993). 
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It appears that some third-wave writers found these ideas particularly fertile grounds for analyzing 
feminism itself. Claims that feminism (especially second-wave feminism) is a disciplinary and regulatory 
discourse that restricts individual freedom and sits authoritatively in judgment over women’s ideas and 
practices can be found in a number of third-wave publications (Henry 2004, 39). Barbara Findlen, editor 
of Listen Up, describes how her peers think that “if something is appealing, fun or popular, it can’t be 
feminist” (1995, xiv). Some third wavers embrace Girlies who reclaimed the word “girl” to address what 
they saw as the antifeminine, anti-joy features of the second wave. For them wearing pink, using nail polish, 
and celebrating pretty power makes feminism playful and fun. “A lot of what Girlie radiates is the luxury 
of self-expression that most second wavers didn’t feel they could or should indulge in….” (Baumgardner 
and Richards 2000, 161; my emphasis). The refrain that second-wave feminists are their “serious sisters” is 
echoed by other third-wave writers (Baumgardner and Richards 2000, 161). 
A far more damning description of second-wave feminism is voiced by Rebecca Walker in To Be Real:
A year before I started this book, my life was like a feminist ghetto. Every decision I made, person I spent time 
with, word I uttered had to measure up to an image I had in my mind of what was morally and politically right 
according to my vision of female empowerment. Everything had a gendered explanation, and what didn’t fit into 
my concept of feminist was “bad, patriarchal, and problematic.” (Walker 1995, xxix)
In the “Afterword” to To Be Real, second-wave theorist Angela Davis describes with amazement (and some 
skepticism) how most contributors to this anthology felt feminism had “incarcerated their individuality—
their desires, aims, and sexual practices” and characterizes this disciplinary feminism as an “imaginary 
feminist status quo” (Davis in Walker 1995, 281).  
The imagery of incarceration evokes Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon prison. In this model 
prison, a few guards (located out of view of the prisoners in a high circular tower) could gaze down upon the 
inmates and their activities. Whether or not guards were present, the effect was to “induce in the prisoners 
a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assured the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 
1979, 201). The result of this internalized, prescriptive panoptical gaze was to make the prisoners their 
own jailers (Foucault 1979, 155). For Foucault, this technique of power was prevalent in modern societies 
where people internalized powerful, prescriptive discourses about what is “normal” or “abnormal,” “sane” 
or “insane,” “healthy” or “pathological”; thus, self-policing becomes a major means of control. 
In “Unpacking the Mother/Daughter Baggage, Reassessing Second- and Third-Wave Tensions” (2002), 
Cathryn Bailey uses Foucaultian imagery to discuss how feminism can be experienced as a repressive form 
of power and authority:  
Many younger women see themselves as struggling against becoming the kind of feminist subjects they thought 
that they were supposed to become. As such, they may be offering a kind of resistance that is not immediately 
directed at actual feminists, but rather to an internalized version of a feminist governor—a “panoptical feminist 
connoisseur.” (Bailey 2002, 150)
Another of Foucault’s modern techniques of power—the confessional—is employed by Gina Dent in 
her article “Missionary Position” (1995). Here, she likens feminism’s ostensible political correctness to 
how missionaries told people of other cultures that the “missionary position” was the only proper way 
to have sex. Although she never mentions Foucault, his imprint is clear in her discussion of feminism as 
both austere and disciplinary. Dent argues that, once we demand a particular form of feminist practice, 
confession becomes “not only a dynamic within feminism, but a means of policing its borders” (Dent 1995, 
71). 
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Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake offer a different analysis of why second-wave feminism’s “master 
narrative” of patriarchal oppression has become “useful only in some contexts” (2004, 18). They discuss how 
globalization and deindustrialization resulted in not only downward mobility for most Americans but also 
income parity for most men and women of their generation. For this reason, they maintain that women of 
Generation X “have more in common with men of their own age group than they do with women of previous 
generations” (2004, 16). Because their generation also was “raised on a multicultural diet” (2004, 16), they 
argue that third wavers are more likely to branch out into other movements for social justice that reflect 
their commitment to intersectional differences, a claim echoed by other third-wave authors (Labaton and 
Martin 2004, xxxi; McCanty in Reger 2005, 201; Dicker 2008, 126–27).  Feminism as a political movement 
thus becomes “less visible” but “more widely dispersed” (Heywood and Drake 2004: 20).8 This localized 
and scattered view of feminist activism, coupled with such dismissals of systemic patriarchal oppression, 
raises important issues about how political praxis and power are conceived.
Different Conceptions of Power and Political Praxis
Power is everywhere, and so ultimately nowhere.
— Nancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?”
If we delve deeper into third-wave epistemological assumptions, we detect other conflicts and contradictions 
between the standpoint epistemology of intersectionality theory and the postmodern epistemology of 
poststructuralism. While these issues have been hotly debated by second-wave feminists, they seem to have 
fallen on deaf ears in the third wave. Take, for example, the debates published in Signs: Journal of Women 
in Culture and Society in 1997 and later reprinted in Harding (2004). Here Patricia Hill Collins highlights 
how an intersectional standpoint epistemology focuses on vantage points as group phenomena:  
First, the notion of a standpoint refers to historically shared, group-based experiences. Groups have a degree 
of permanence over time such that group realities transcend individual experiences…. I stress this difference 
between the individual and the group as units of analysis because using these two constructs as if they were 
interchangeable clouds understanding of a host of topics…. (Collins 2004, 247–49; original emphasis)
In contrast, a postmodern epistemology deconstructs all group categories as essentialist. For example, 
Judith Grant argues that “groups are not cut out of whole cloth”; they have “no single voice or vision of 
reality” but rather are made up of people with heterogeneous experiences (Grant 1993, 94). This argument 
has critical implications for many feminist frameworks, including intersectionality theory. Even though 
intersectionality theorists called into question the essentialist category of “women” as ignoring differences 
between women by race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation, a similar critique could be leveled 
against their own group concepts, such as Collins’s “Black feminist thought” or Gloria Anzaldúa’s “new 
mestiza consciousness” (Collins 1990; Anzaldúa 1987). 
Poststructuralist-inspired queer theorist Steven Seidman speaks directly to these issues when he 
discusses how even “the assertion of a black, middle-class, American, lesbian identity silences differences 
in this social category that relate to religion, regional location … to feminism, age or education” (Seidman 
2000, 441). Here differences are infinite and each individual is potentially unique. In contrast, for Collins, 
the notion of standpoint refers to groups who have shared histories because of their shared location in 
relations of unequal power and privilege. They are neither groups based simply on identities chosen by 
individuals nor groups analytically created by demographers, bureaucrats or scholars. For her, to call for 
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the deconstruction of all group categories in the name of critiquing essentialism is simply to move to a 
“language game of politics” (Collins 2004, 248 and 252–53).
Intersectionality theorists also make clearer distinctions between oppression and difference. For them, 
not all differences are axes of structural social oppression. For example, both intersectionality theorists 
and poststructuralists speak of “marginalized” peoples. Yet the former anchor this concept in hierarchically 
structured, group-based inequalities, while poststructuralists often are referring to people whose behaviors 
lie outside of or transgress social norms. This latter conception of “margins” includes a much broader swath 
of people where the normative structure rather than structural relations of oppression is determinate. 
Indeed, not all countercultural lifestyles and politics reflect the historical, institutionalized oppressions 
highlighted by intersectionality theorists; even groups such as the Michigan militia or the Ku Klux Klan 
are marginalized groups in terms of transgressing norms. This is why Collins argues that, when scholars 
took the postmodern turn, “conceptions of power shifted—talk of tops and bottoms, long associated with 
hierarchy, were recast as flattened geographies of centers and margins” that “rob the term of oppression 
of its critical and oppositional importance” (Collins 1998, 129 and 136). Similarly, Kimberlé Crenshaw 
suggests that such “flattening” of intersectionality results from the absence of a structural and political 
critique (quoted in Berger and Guidroz 2009, 70). 
Following in the footsteps of their theoretical father Foucault, poststructuralists and queer theorists 
also deconstruct identity categories, arguing that they are restrictive fictions that should be jettisoned as 
a basis for politics or, at the very least, opened up for critical interrogation (Butler 1990; Seidman 2000).9 
A number of third-wave authors adopt their view of identities as restrictive (Senna in Walker 1995, 20; 
Heywood and Drake 1997; McCanty in Reger 2005):
We fear that identity will dictate and regulate our lives, instantaneously pitting us against someone, forcing us 
to choose inflexible and unchanging sides, female against male, black again white, oppressed against oppressor, 
good against bad…. (Walker 1995, xxxiii)
In contrast, intersectionality theorists such as the Combahee River Collective view multi-axis identity 
politics as the “most profound and potentially most radical politics” and they choose sides against their 
oppressors without hesitation ([1977] 2005, 313). For them, coalitions are the major means for building a 
social movement based on difference. Crenshaw’s article on identity politics makes clear her rejection of 
single-axis identity politics. However, she describes the “postmodern idea” of viewing identity categories 
as socially constructed fictions as a “vulgarized social constructionism” that reveals how power is exercised 
through the process of categorization but fails to understand the social and material consequences of this 
categorization ([1995] 2005, 539). Thus, she finds it dangerous for guiding political praxis. Rather, she 
argues: “At this point in history, a strong case can be made that the most critical resistance strategy for 
disempowered groups is to occupy and defend a politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy 
it” ([1995] 2005, 539). Similarly, Nikol Alexander-Floyd highlights how “Women of color feminists generally 
support identity politics centered on complex, negotiated understandings of group interests” (2012, 11; my 
emphasis). Indeed, a theory and politics that views freedom as “living in the happy limbo of nonidentity” 
(Foucault quoted in Grant 1993, 131) would make women of color invisible.  
Many third-wave writers also follow poststructuralists and queer theorists such as Judith Butler (1990) 
to focus on transgressive acts as outlaw performances that challenge and subvert (Heely 1996; Delombard 
in Walker 1995; Stoller 1999, 84). This is most visible in third-wave writings on sexuality and sexual 
practices. Nan Bauer-Maglin and Donna Perry, editors of “Bad Girls”/“Good Girls,” describe “sexuality 
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in all its guises” as the “lightning rod of their generation’s hopes and discontents,”  likening it to how civil 
rights and the Vietnam war galvanized the generation of the 1960s (1996, xvi). In her most recent book, 
Sisterhood Interrupted: From Radical Women to Grrls Gone Wild (2007), Siegel describes how third-wave 
writers celebrate their “sexual bravado” and revel in a “feminist badass” image (2007, 124 and 155–57). 
Queer theoretical assumptions are prevalent in the works of third-wave authors who embrace a profusion 
of gendered subjects as well as a lusty, “no sex toy unturned” approach to sexual practices (Stoller 1999, 
84). As one analyst put it, “the term ‘queer’ has been used to mark a new formulation of politics for this new 
generation of feminists” (Henry 2004, 115).  
Yet, the crux of queer theory is “resistance to regimes of the normal” (Warner 1993, xxvi; Duggan 1992; 
Halberstam 2005). Precisely because the coercive effects of the normative structure can be felt even in 
the most innocuous social interactions, poststructuralists and queer theorists point out how “power is 
everywhere” and “can even come from below” (Foucault 1980, 93). For example, in GenderQueer: Voices 
from beyond the Gender Binary, Riki Wilchins describes how she felt the normative surveillance of gender 
transgression when she was purchasing a newspaper or sitting on a bus (Wilchins in Nestle, Howell 
and Wilchins 2002, 51). In short, queer scholars focus heavily on a micropolitics of resistance (such as 
performance politics) rather than on hierarchical, structural power relations and macrostructural change.  
Along with third-wave authors who embrace queer theory’s focus on micropolitics and dismissal of 
identity politics, other third-wave authors explain their commitment to local action and rejection of identity 
politics as stemming from different reasons. In regard to cultural activism—another major site of third-
wave activism—Heywood and Drake claim that creating their own media sites and networks as forms of 
“localized,” “radical dispersal” better resists “co-optation by global technoculture” than does identity politics 
(2004, 20). In contrast, for intersectionality theorists such as Patricia Hill Collins, an “overemphasis” on 
local politics “flies in the face of actual historical successes” and “undercuts” political activism (1998, 135). 
She views the postmodern focus on the local as the most effective terrain of struggle as seductively deceptive. 
By erasing macrostructural power from their purview, activists can appear to challenge oppression, while 
“secretly believing such efforts are doomed” (Collins 1998, 135).  
Moreover, rather than the group concepts embraced by intersectionality theorists, a strong strain of 
individualism characterizes many third-wave publications. As Heyward and Drake write, “Despite our 
knowing better, despite our knowing its emptiness, the ideology of individualism is still a major motivating 
force in many third wave lives” (1997, 11). Over a decade later, Shelley Budgeon  describes third-wave authors 
as still “privileging individual experience” and even names one of her chapters in Third Wave Feminism 
and the Politics of Gender in Late Modernity “A Politics of Self” (2011, 103 and 191). This individualistic 
approach is visible not only in the third wave’s “penchant for personal narratives” (Springer 2002, 1060), 
but also in many third wavers’ “do-it-yourself” (DIY) approach to feminism. No doubt, the DIY approach 
can be empowering when it motivates feminists to take action to accomplish their goals.10 However, the 
notion that feminism as a political movement can be an individual’s DIY project has disturbing implications 
for collective action. Consider the words of Marcelle Karp, co-editor of The Bust Guide to the New Girl 
Order (1999):
We’ve entered an era of DIY feminism—sistah, do-it-yourself—and we have all kinds of names for ourselves, 
lipstick lesbians, do-me feminists... No matter what the flava is, we’re still feminists. Your feminism is what you 
want it to be and what you make of it. (quoted in Karp and Stoller 1999, 310–11)
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This view of the third wave is echoed in Astrid Henry’s article “Solitary Sisterhood” when she describes 
third-wave texts as “replete with individual definitions of feminism” (2005, 82).
In contrast, intersectionality theorists embrace neither an individualistic nor a relativistic feminism. 
Over two decades ago, bell hooks criticized feminist relativism in her book Feminist Theory: From Margin 
to Center (1984):
Currently feminism seems to be a term without any clear significance. The “anything goes” approach to the 
definition has rendered it practically meaningless. (…) such definitions usually focus on the individual’s own 
right to freedom and self-determination. (hooks 1984, 23) 
hooks is especially critical of feminism being viewed as a “lifestyle choice” rather than as a “political 
commitment” (hooks 1984, 27). She argues for a feminism defined in “political terms” that stresses collective 
rather than individual well-being and that calls for social revolution rather than simply personal lifestyle 
reform (hooks 1984, 23). Additional critiques of the political inefficacy of postmodern relativism can be 
found in Collins’s Fighting Words (1998).
In contrast, relativism is embraced in Rebecca Walker’s anthology To Be Real (1995). In this anthology, 
not only can one find authors who want “to be free” to engage in vigilante violence and to eroticize the 
violent rape of a child with a baseball bat, but Walker views as “liberating” these authors’ “courageous 
reckoning” with such “anti-revolution acts” (meaning acts that most second-wave feminists would criticize) 
(Walker 1995, xxxviii). She writes:
If feminism is to continue to be radical and alive, it must avoid reordering the world in terms of any polarity, be 
it female/male, good/evil. (1995, xxxv)
The contributors to “Polyphonic Feminisms” (2010) also suggest that multiple truths can “work together 
to create a coherent whole” according to their concept of “polyphony,” derived from a musical term that 
describes the way multiple melodies can “co-exist without dominance” (Van Deven and Kubala 2010, 3). 
It is not clear what these authors mean by “dominance” here. While they explicitly welcome diversity and 
dissent, their fear of “dominance” suggests a reticence to judge other feminists’ ideas as less valid or credible 
and a preference for a sanguine, even if noisy, political pluralism.  
Yet standpoint theorists have long argued that feminists must be able to adjudicate or judge between 
competing knowledge claims in order for theory to guide political practice. Dorothy Smith, for example, 
argues that if knowledge is to have an impact on politics, “there must exist the possibility that one account 
can invalidate another” (Smith 1987, 121–22). In “High Noon in Textland” (1993) and “Telling the Truth 
after Postmodernism” (1996), she mocks the political impotency of a postmodern relativist epistemology. 
Similarly, Sandra Harding claims that epistemological relativism opens up a Pandora’s box for any and every 
viewpoint to claim legitimacy, even those harmful to the interests of women or other oppressed groups; for 
her, relativism is an “anathema” to feminism (Harding 1993, 61). Indeed, the idea that feminism should 
avoid making any judgments as to good or evil, right or wrong, belies its role as a politics. What are politics 
but the methods by which people make decisions about what is right and wrong, fair and unfair, equal and 
unequal, and what should be done to resolve, reform, or transform these situations? 
In Catching a Wave (2003), third-wave analysts Dicker and Piepmeier suggest a more nuanced approach. 
They consider it fine for third wavers to challenge a restrictive notion of feminism not of their own making. 
They also agree with opening up and broadening the notion of feminism to make it appealing to a more 
diverse array of women. However, in their view, the absence of any boundaries on what feminism means 
“empties feminism of any core set of values and politics” and results in a “feminist free-for-all”:  
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If everything and everyone can fit within the third wave—it doesn’t matter what they actually think, do or 
believe…. This is the worst interpretation of bell hooks’ edict that “feminism is for everybody,” it implies that 
anybody can be a feminist, regardless of her or his actions. (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 17)
The Lived Messiness of Third-Wave Authors’ Epistemological Stance
The lived messiness characteristic of the third wave is what defines it….
— Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, Third Wave Agenda
Unlike earlier studies that often focused on generational criteria to define the third wave, this study has 
highlighted the theoretical and epistemological assumptions of major US third-wave publications as an 
alternative way of understanding third-wave discourse and its implications for political praxis. I have argued 
that US third-wave authors created an unhappy and untenable marriage by wedding two approaches—
poststructuralism and intersectionality theory—that have distinct and contradictory epistemologies. I’ve 
discussed their common ground as well as their contested terrain in terms of the importance of theory; the 
value placed on individualism versus collectivism; their different conceptions of power and political praxis; 
and whether embracing relativism results in a localized, radically dispersed, and anything-goes politics. 
As documented in this study, other analysts of third-wave texts have identified many of these same issues 
before.  However, none have traced them in such a detailed way to their deeper epistemological roots.
It is said that third wavers “live comfortably with paradox” (Siegel 2007, 143) and value contradictions or 
their “lived messiness” as a means to a more open and inclusive feminism (Heywood and Drake 1997, 8; Dicker 
2008, 103).11 This would be fine if the messy conflicts and contradictions embodied in the epistemologies 
of their major publications did not lead to serious political (rather than generational) disconnects with 
other feminists that “have widened, rather than narrowed” over time (Siegel 2007, 161).12 Some third-wave 
authors, such as the contributors to “Polyphonic Feminisms” (2010), are more astute at recognizing the 
difficulties of working through these contradictions to build a movement based on difference. Yet, they still 
“preserve a hope for collective engagement” (Sameh 2011). However, if the individualism and relativism of 
this unhappy marriage’s postmodern epistemological legacy prevail, cacophony rather than polyphony will 
result, and we will be left with scattered forms of resistance marching to different drums.  
This is a particularly serious issue today when, within the United States, the most politically organized 
response to the radical insecurities engendered by postmodernity have come from the right rather than 
from the left, in the form of the various groups that united under the rubric of the Tea Party. Their calls for 
small government and privatization have already dismantled many government jobs and social services 
that affect the lives of women and children, not to mention their warmongering, imperialist stance, and 
their hostility to reproductive freedom, LGBTQ issues, and immigrant rights. While the Mad Hatters in 
this Tea Party were able to mobilize in a collective, mass-based movement, feminists seem unable to follow 
suit, even though this right-wing populism is an immense threat to those in social locations marginalized 
by gender, race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and global location.  
Choosing between a postmodern path that embraces an anything-goes feminism or developing a body 
of politics that enables us to act collectively appears to be one of the most important issues confronting 
feminists today. Whether voiced in Joan Morgan’s hip-hop language that “sistahood is critical to our mutual 
survival” (1999, 232) or in the playful words of the Girlie admirers, the message is the same: “Without a 
body of politics, the nail polish is really going to waste” (Baumgardner and Richards 2000, 166). Otherwise, 
instead of “making tidal waves together” we will end up simply “splashing in different pools” (Siegel 2007, 
161).  
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Notes
The author wishes to thank Oxford University Press for giving her  permission to draw from Chapters 1, 5, 6, 7, and the 
Conclusion of Doing Feminist Theory: From Modernity to Postmodernity (2012).
1. Examples of nineteenth-century precursors of intersectionality include Harriet Jacobs ([1861] 2001) and Anna 
Julia Cooper ([1892] 1988). 
2. See McCall (2005), Nash (2010), Hancock (2007), Choo and Ferree (2010), and Alexander-Floyd (2012) for a 
discussion of various ways in which “intersectionality” has been used and misused.
3. Castles and Miller (1993) coined the term “feminization of migration” to refer to the phenomenon of women mak-
ing up an increasing proportion of immigrants.
4. See, for example, the poem by Alix Olson and the article by Lisa Jervis in Berger (2006).
5. Though Budgeon is British, she addresses many writings by US feminists in Third Wave Feminism and the Poli-
tics of Gender in Late Modernity (2011).
6. Many contributors to this anthology are indigenous women from Canada. They are included here because First 
Nation women do not always recognize the same juridical nation-state boundaries that my US-focused perspective 
observes.
7. Ironically in the context of this discussion, Spivak is known for using and defending an abstruse style and theoreti-
cal language (Morton 2003, 5–6).
8. One wonders how third-wave activists will avoid the problem of feminist issues being treated as less important in 
other movements for social justice, an experience shared by their predecessors in the abolitionist movement and in the 
anti–Vietnam war and civil rights movements.
9. Only a few queer theorists have questioned the political efficacy of this deconstructive dismissal of identities. No-
tably, Judith/Jack Halberstam rejects “happily casting off” identities as a “neoliberal” notion of “uniqueness as radical 
style” (2005, 19).
10. For a discussion of the empowering potential of a DIY approach see Klein in Heywood and Drake (1997) and 
Duncan in Reger (2005).
11. Rory Dicker even titles her chapter on the third wave “Third Wave Feminism: Embracing Contradiction” (2008, 
103).
12. Deborah Siegel views these disconnects as resulting from a “generational divide” (2007, 161). In contrast, I argue 
they reflect a political divide stemming from different theoretical and epistemological assumptions.
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